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During the 1980s, increased attention was paid by the united 
Auto Workers union and politicians to the u.s. automobile 
industry and the problems it was facing from Japanese 
competition. Now, with 1992 being a presidential election year, 
the candidates are continuing to draw attention to what they see 
as the problems of the u.s. auto industry. And this concern is 
not without reason. The share of the u.s. market held by the Big 
Three domestic producers (GM, Ford, and Chrysler), has decreased 
dramatically over the past three decades. As is shown in Figure 
1, the market share of u.s. based producers has fallen from a 
high of 95.11% in 1962, to aroUnd 82% in the mid-1970S, to a low 
of around 64% in 1987 (MVMA World Motor Vehicle Data, 1990). 
These figures become even more alarming if we look at the market 
share of foreign transplants (i.e.-foreign auto production plants 
in the U.S.) and imports taken together. They accounted for 41% 
of the market in 1990 (Singleton, 1992, p.22). 
The problems of the Big Three can also be seen in the 
generally declining levels of employment over the past 10 to 15 
years (see Figure 2). From a peak level of 1,004,900 employees 
in 1978, employment fell to a low of 704,800 in 1982, and is now 
just above 800,000 employees (Monthly Labor Review, various 
issues). The purpose of this paper, then, is to explain these 
drastic fluctuations in auto industry employment from 1960 
through 1990. Both theoretical and empirical analysis are used 
to test several demand-side hypotheses about these changing 
employment levels. Specifically, employment is hypothesized to 
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be influenced by 1) the level of international competition, 2) 
the extent of union (UAW) power, 3) the implementation of labor­
saving and productivity-enhancing technologies, and 4) 
outsourcing arrangements of the Big Three. Changes in these four 
areas can be shown to shift or change the elasticity of the 
demand curve for labor in the automobile industry. 
The rest of this paper will proceed as follows: section I 
will present a brief historical overview of the U.S. auto 
industry since the 1960s. section II will discuss the 
theoretical arguments behind each of the four employment 
influencing areas mentioned earlier. The empirical model based 
on this theoretical discussion will be presented in Section III, 
with the results being given in Section IV. Finally, Section V 
will draw some conclusions and make some suggestions for future 
research. 
I. THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY: AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
In the late 1960s, the U.s. auto industry was very different 
from what it is now. The Big Three (GM, Ford, Chrysler) 
dominated the U.S. market for automobiles, facing very minimal 
foreign competition (Singleton, 1992, p.1S). Only Volkswagen was 
competing in the U.S~ market, allowing U.S. producers to capture 
between 90 and 95% of the market for the majority of the decade. 
Practically 100% of the employees in the industry were members of 
the United Auto Workers (UAW), giving the union a large degree of 
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-"monopoly power" (i.e.--the ability to maintain wages above 
equilibrium along a relatively inelastic demand curve for labor). 
Because the industry was highly concentrated with the Big Three 
controlling almost the entire market, they could accept these 
higher wage demands and more strict work rules, passing the 
higher labor costs along to consumers in the form of higher 
product prices (i.e.--the product demand curve was relatively 
inelastic). In other words, the lack of competition allowed the 
Big Three to maintain automobile prices high enough to guarantee 
profitability, even in the face of high union labor costs. 
However, things started to. change in the early 1970s with 
the first oil shock in 1973. OPEC restricted the supply of crude 
oil, causing the price of oil and gasoline to skyrocket. 
Consumer preferences began to shift toward smaller, more fuel 
efficient automobiles which were not offered by the Big Three 
(Singleton, 1992, p.19). Enter Japan. Offering a line of 
smaller, lower cost, fuel efficient cars and relying on a new 
image of technical excellence and high product quality, the 
Japanese began taking larger and larger parts of the u.S. market 
from the Big Three (Tolliday and Zeitlin, 1986, p.197). This 
trend accelerated through the 1970s, with the Japanese increasing 
their market share from 7.6% in 1969 to 22.7% after the second 
oil shock of 1979. 
As the Big Three tried to catch up in the production of 
small, fuel efficient cars, they began working against their 
comparative advantage in the production of large cars. Incurring 
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high product development and design costs for this new line of 
small cars, the profits of the Big Three started to shrink. Labor 
costs (as well as the costs of other inputs) therefore became 
more of an issue as the Big Three tried to maintain profits and 
market share. with the competition from Japan becoming more 
intense, the latest in manufacturing technologies were being 
adopted "to raise productivity, lower costs, and improve quality" 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1985). 
The auto industry by the 1980s had emerged as a more 
competitive industry, very different from the highly concentrated 
industry of the 1960s. The high union labor costs could no 
longer be passed on to consumers, so employment began to fall and 
plant closings were threatened. A period of concessionary 
bargaining began in the early 1980s as the UAW scrambled to save 
the jobs of its members. 
More recently, u.s. producers have been increasingly moving 
toward outside suppliers of parts and components--nonunion 
suppliers in many cases--to take advantage of lower labor costs. 
Moves to Mexico by many parts suppliers have become reality 
rather than just threats, jeopardizing the jobs of many u.s. 
workers. New outsourcing arrangements for parts have become more 
and more important as u.s. auto producers strive to match the 
Japanese. 
6 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
From the overview presented above, four important areas 
emerge as being strong influences on employment in the u.s. auto 
industry: 1) international competition, 2) union power, 3) 
technological change, and 4) outsourcing arrangements. The 
following discussion illustrates how changes in these areas will 
theoretically effect the demand for labor in the auto industry. 
Changes in these areas are shown to either shift or change 
the elasticity of the demand curve. Basic demand theory is used 
to illustrate shifts in the demand curve, while the Hicks­
Marshall Laws of Derived Demand are used to explain changes in 
the elasticity of demand for labor. These laws state that the 
wage elasticity of demand for a particular category of labor will 
be high under the following circumstances: 
"1) when the price elasticity of demand for the product being 
produced is high; 
2) when other factors of production can be easily 
substituted for the category of labor; 
3) when the supply of other factors of production is highly 
elastic ••• ; and 
4) when the cost of employing the category of labor is a 
large share of the total costs of production" (Ehrenberg and 
Smith, 1991, p.109). 
It is important to note here that the four areas under 
7 
..
 
consideration as determinants of employment are all demand-side 
variables. The following arguments are made under the assumption 
that the supply of labor curve in the auto industry is upward 
sloping and held constant. Because the UAW is a trade union 
rather than a craft union, it cannot restrict the supply of labor 
in the industry. The auto makers are assumed to be able to hire 
the demanded quantity of labor at the negotiated wage rate and to 
be able to adjust the quantity of labor employed as market 
conditions change. In other words, ignoring the supply side of 
the labor market as a determinant of employment seems reasonable 
because the negotiated wage is,. no doubt, above equilibrium. 
Evidence of this is persistent unemployment (i.e. excess supply) 
in the industry as well as the fact that the ratio of auto 
worker-to-total manUfacturing wages is greater than one (see 
Cline, 1986). Therefore, employment is determined by equating 
the wage to the demand for labor curve. Workers will always be 
available at union-scale wages, so supply considerations are not 
important. 
International competition 
As can be seen from the discussion in section I and the 
graph of U.s. market share presented in Figure 1, the structure 
of the auto industry has changed dramatically since the 1960s. 
Whereas there were only three major competitors (GM, Ford, 
Chrysler) in the U.S. market in the 1960s, controlling up to 95% 
of the market, there are now at least ten strong competitors. 
8 
-only three of these competitors are u.s. corporations (the Big 
Three), with foreign auto makers having taken over 35% of the 
market by the late 1980s (see Figure 1). 
The high concentration of the industry in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, along with the nature of the product market, is 
indicative of the monopolistically competitive market structure, 
which lies between monopoly and perfect competition. With this 
type of market structure, the producers are able to set their 
prices above the intersection of the marginal cost and marginal 
revenue curves, say at Po (see Figure 3A). In this situation, 
the Big Three were able to acquiesce to the UAW's demand for 
higher wages and stricter work rules because these higher labor 
costs could be passed on to consumers in the form of higher 
product prices. That is, the high profits earned by the Big 
Three (shown as the area of PoABC in Fig. 3A) made room for wage 
increases to union workers. 
However, as Japanese firms began to enter the u.s. market 
with the oil shocks of the 1970s, the situation facing the Big 
Three began to change. With more competitors in the market, the 
monopolistic competition model would predict that two things 
should happen. First, the product demand curve for each of the 
Big Three firms should shift to the left as they will be able to 
sell fewer automobiles at any given price (see Figure 3B). 
Second, the product demand curve facing each firm should also 
become more elastic as more and more automobiles are available 
for consumers to choose from. The demand for automobiles will be 
9
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more sensitive to price changes due to the increased options of 
consumers. The new demand curve will look like D' in Figure 3B 
(see varian, 1986 for a more complete discussion of monopolistic 
competition). 
Big Three producers will now only be able to charge P, for 
their output due to the increased competition from Japanese 
firms. Profits will be squeezed (area of P,A'B'C' in Fig. 3B) as 
firms move toward zero long run economic profits (Varian, 1986, 
p.438). Labor demands for high wages can no longer be as readily 
accepted as in the 1960s and early 1970s if the Big Three firms 
want to maintain their market share. 
The effects of this change of market composition on demand 
for labor will be as follows: First the demand curve for labor 
facing U.s. producers will shift left in response to the leftward 
shift in product demand (remember, labor demand is derived from 
product demand). Second, the demand for labor curve will become 
more elastic according to the first of the Hicks-Marshall Laws of 
Derived Demand. Overall, then, the increase in international 
competition that began in the early 1970s and has continued 
through the present should cause employment in the auto industry 
to fall and become more sensitive to changes in wage and benefit 
demands by the UAW. Certainly, this relationship seems plausible 
from a quick analysis of Figures 1 and 2. It will be empirically 
tested later in the paper. 
11 
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union Power 
The United Auto Workers (UAW) union has historically been 
very strong in the U.S. auto industry (at least back to 1960, the 
beginning point of this study). Although the UAW enjoys very 
cooperative relations with management these days, "its clout--at 
the bargaining table and in the political arena--is waning" 
(Lowell, 1985, p.1). This loss of power can be seen by looking 
at four areas: unionization rates, real wages, pattern 
bargaining, and domestic content. 
The level of unionization by the UAW has been decreasing 
recently. UAW membership was at 1.2 million in 1985, with 
automotive hourly employees accounting for 587,307 members. This 
figure represents a 22.5% decrease from 757,328 automotive 
members just ten years earlier in 1975 (Lowell, Sept. 1985, p.2). 
Furthermore, Japanese transplants in the U.S. (with the exception 
of the Mitsubishi plant in Bloomington/Normal, IL) have been very 
reluctant to even recognize the UAW as a bargaining agent 
(Lowell, 1985, p.5). Although this reflects a choice by 
employees rather than by the employer, it still represents a 
general trend away from the power that the UAW once held in the 
U.S. auto industry. 
This loss of union power can also be seen by looking at 
Figure 4. Over the past six to eight years, union wages have 
failed to keep pace with inflation, having decreased rather 
steadily since 1984. And in the early 1980s, the UAW was forced 
to abandon its goal of high wages during the period of 
12 
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concessionary bargaining in order to save jobs (Ready, 1980, 
p.272). 
Pattern bargaining is a more difficult issue, however. 
While pattern bargaining during the 1960s and 1970s strongly 
influenced settlements in general, the 1980s saw wage settlements 
that varied across firms and that were driven by increased 
competitive pressures (Ready, 1990, p.272). The auto industry's 
pattern bargaining took the form of wage leadership, where one of 
the Big Three would settle with the UAW and then the other two 
would fall in line. While Ready (1990) argues that pattern 
bargaining in general increased over the 1977-1983 period, she 
concedes that the auto industry was a strong exception to this 
trend. Interestingly enough, an examination of the 1987 and 1990 
contracts between the Big Three and the UAW seems to show a 
return to pattern bargaining (Monthly Labor Review, various 
issues). In 1987, Ford settled first, and in 1990 GM settled 
first, but the language and provisions of the others closely 
paralleled the leader's contract in both years. What exactly 
this means in terms of union power, I am not sure, but it may be 
a reflection of the more cooperative union-management relations 
alluded to earlier. 
Finally, the decrease in union power can be shown by the 
increasing amounts of foreign parts in u.s. produced cars. This 
will be covered later, but it is useful to point out here that 
non-U.S. suppliers are expected to provide 36% of auto components 
in 1990 (Tolliday and Zeitlin, 1986, p.204). These new 
14 
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outsourcing arrangements put the jobs of up to 70,000 UAW members 
in jeopardy (Sorge, 1991, p.20). 
Overall, then, it would seem that the UAW has been losing 
some of its "monopoly power" over the past ten to fifteen years. 
As union monopoly power generally results in a more inelastic 
demand for labor curve, allowing for wage increases with small 
reductions in employment, this loss of monopoly power by the UAW 
should result in a more elastic demand for labor curve (Davies, 
1991, p.3). The effect on employment of this more elastic demand 
for labor curve should be negative, as employment is now more 
sensitive to increased wage and benefit demands by the UAW. 
Technology 
The intense competition from Japanese auto makers has been 
causing U.S. auto makers to make many changes, one of which 
involves the implementation of new technologies. Industrial 
rObots, computers, and programmable controllers are all being 
used to a greater extent by the Big Three these days in efforts 
to raise productivity and quality and to reduce costs. 
Ultimately, these changes will affect the level of employment in 
the U.S. auto industry. But will new technologies serve to 
reduce employment (substitution effect) or increase employment 
(scale effect)? 
The Substitution effect is probably the more common of the 
two when thinking about capital-for-labor substitutions. This 
effect will be negative according to the second Law of Derived 
15 
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Demand; that is, an increase in technology implementation will 
reduce employment. Capital and labor are substitutes in the 
production process. In the auto industry, this effect can be 
seen in the fact that new technologies generally replace certain 
types or categories of workers. For example, computer-aided 
design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) systems tend to "reduce unit 
labor requirements for engineers, drafters, machine operators, 
and tool-and-die makers" (Bureau of Labor statistics, 1985, 
p.37). Similarly, industrial robots are said to perform the work 
of about 1.5 workers per shift for spot welding, and of one 
worker per shift for materials handling (Bureau of Labor 
statistics, 1985, p.36). According to one study (Allen, 1987), 
the principal motivation for robotic welding is labor savings. 
Of course, while some categories of workers will be 
displaced by the use of new technologies, there will also be new 
jobs associated with these technologies. These new jobs will· 
primarily be in skilled areas such as maintenance, programming, 
and electrical control (Allen, 1987, p.91). Although his study 
is somewhat dated, Allen (1987} predicted a loss of 73,200 
unskilled jobs and a gain of 6200 skilled jobs due to robots 
alone by 1990 (no current numbers were available to confirm this 
prediction). This would amount to an overall net loss of 67,000 
jobs, illustrating the negative effects on employment of capital­
for-labor substitutions. 
The opposite effect, the scale effect, would predict an 
increase in employment due to technology implementation. The 
16 
scale effect in the auto industry would work as follows: The 
implementation of new technologies will increase the productivity 
(output per hour) of employees. Fewer units of labor will be 
required to produce the same amount of output. This will result 
in lower product prices and, according to basic demand theory, a 
higher quantity of automobiles demanded. consequently, the 
demand for labor will increase because it is derived from the 
demand for automobiles (see Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991 for a more 
complete discussion of the scale effect). 
Whether the substitution effect or the scale effect will 
dominate cannot be known from theoretical discussion alone. But 
labor theory does give us some idea about conditions under which 
capital and labor are likely to be gross substitutes based on the 
Hicks-Marshall Laws of Derived Demand (i.e.--conditions under 
Which the substitution effect dominates the scale effect): 
1) the SUbstitution effect will be stronger to the extent 
that capital is a substitute for labor in the production 
process and that it is relatively easy for firms to make the 
substitution; and 
2) the scale effect will be relatively weak if there is an 
inelastic product demand and if capital constitutes a small 
share of total cost in the industry experiencing automation 
(Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991, p.125). 
These conditions suggest that both the substitution and scale 
effects may be strong in the auto industry. Condition 1 seems to 
hold based on the labor displacement estimates due to robotics 
given above, pointing to a strong substitution effect. However, 
condition 2 does not hold for the auto industry, as product 
demand is relatively elastic (sensitive to fluctuations in price) 
and capital would appear to constitute a relatively large share 
17 
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of total cost in the industry. This points to a strong scale 
effect as well. 
Theoretically, then, we cannot predict whether the 
substitution or scale effect will dominate in the auto industry. 
The answer to this question is left to the empirical model 
developed in the next section. Certainly, though, the argument 
that new technologies will affect employment is theoretically 
sound, regardless of the direction of the change. 
outsourcing 
The issue of outsourcing (i.e.--auto producers going outside 
the company and many times outside the country for parts) has 
been hotly debated over the past ten years. From the employer's 
perspective, it makes perfect sense to go outside the company and 
get the same parts for $10 an hour in labor costs instead of the 
$27 an hour that UAW workers get (Smith, 1989). But from the 
viewpoint of the auto workers and the UAW, these new outsourcing 
arrangements put jobs at stake--the jobs of up to 70,000 UAW 
members, to be more precise (Sorge, 1991, p.20). 
Although recent union contracts have beefed-up income 
protection packages for laid-off workers and restrictions on 
outsourcing (Cimini, 1991, p.20), outsourcing by the Big Three 
either to non-union suppliers or to over-seas suppliers will 
reduce the demand for labor in the industry. Essentially, the 
use of foreign-built parts reduces domestic employment by 
transferring demand abroad. Imports of auto parts by the Big 
18 
-Three rose from $2.7 billion in 1982 to $5.6 billion in 1986 
(singleton, 1992, p. 26). Tolliday and zeitlirr (1986) estimated 
that non-U.S. suppliers would provide 36% of auto components by 
1990, up from 26% in 1985 (current figures were not available to 
confirm this forecast). 
Another effect outsourcing could have on the demand for 
labor is to increase the elasticity of the demand curve. 
According to the second of the Hicks-Marshall Laws of Derived 
Demand, the elasticity of demand for auto workers will be high 
"when other factors of production can be easily substituted" for 
auto workers (Ehrenberg and smith, 1991, p.109). The 
Substitution taking place in the case of outsourcing would be one 
of non-union labor for union labor or unskilled for skilled labor 
as auto makers increasingly move toward foreign suppliers for 
parts and components. As this Substitution takes place, 
employment in the auto industry becomes much more sensitive to 
changes in the wage rate. 
To the extent that the demand curve for labor shifts to the 
left and becomes more elastic as outsourcing by the Big Three 
increases, employment may be drastically reduced. However, if 
either of these changes occurs independently, employment should 
still be reduced, albeit by a smaller amount. 
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-III. EMPIRICAL MODEL
 
The theoretical discussion above highlights four hypotheses 
concerning the demand for employment in the u.s. auto industry: 
1) changes in the share of the u.s. market held by domestic 
producers are hypothesized to directly affect the demand for 
labor in the industry: 
2) changes in the power of the UAW are hypothesized to 
inversely affect the demand for labor: 
3) changes in technology implementation will affect labor 
demand either negatively (if the substitution effect 
prevails), or positively (if the scale effect prevails): and 
4) changes in outsourcing arrangements should inversely 
affect the demand for labor in the u.s. auto industry. 
These four hypotheses are built into and tested by the model 
developed in this section (with the exception of Hypothesis 4, 
which will be explained later). 
OLS mUltiple regression analysis is used with industry-wide 
data from SIC 371 covering the-1960-1990 period. The regression 
equation takes the form: 
EmploYt = a, + a~tsht + a3RealWaget + a4output/Hrt + asUnemPt 
The variables are defined in Table I, and their sources are 
given. Below, each variable and its expected coefficient is 
explained in the context of its respective hypothesis. 
20 
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TABLE 1--VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
-----------------------------------------------------------~---
Employ 
MktSh 
RealWage 
output/Hr 
Unemp 
Number of employees in the motor 
vehicles and equipment industry, SIC 371 
(Source: Monthly Labor Review, 
various issues) 
% of the u.S. market for automobiles 
held by domestic producers. Measured 
by the % of new vehicle registrations 
each year in the u.S. (Source: MVMA 
World Motor Vehicle Data, 1990) 
Average wage of production workers in 
SIC 371 divided by the CPI (Source: 
Handbook of Labor Statistics, Business 
statistics) 
Average output per employee hour in 
SIC 371. Measured as index with 1977= 
100 (Source: Handbook of Labor 
Statistics) 
Total unemployment rate in u.S. economy 
(Source: Business Statistics) 
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Hypothesis 1 
The coefficient a on the market share variable should bez 
positive according to Hypothesis 1. That is, as the share of the 
u.s. market held by domestic producers decreases, the demand for 
labor by domestic producers should decrease. This will be 
reflected graphically by a shift to the left and/or an increase 
in the elasticity of the demand for labor curve. The market 
share variable is measured as the percent of new vehicles 
registered in the u.s. that were domestically produced. The only 
shortcoming of this measure is that it also includes vehicles 
produced in foreign transplants in the u.s. If cars sold by 
transplants displace imported sales, the net effect on employment 
in the u.s. motor vehicle industry would be positive. However, 
if transplant sales displace the sales of the Big Three (i.e.-­
add to the sales of imports), employment in the u.s. auto 
industry will decrease (singleton, 1992, p.23). In the latter 
case, the coefficient az will understate the effect of loss of 
market share on labor demand in the u.s. auto industry; in the 
former, the effect will be overstated. 
Hypothesis 2 
The effects of changes in union power are measured by a 
proxy, the real wage in the motor vehicle and equipment industry 
(SIC 371). This should be a reasonable proxy, as union power 
will be shown partly by its ability to increase wages in an 
industry. However, it does fail to take into account fringe 
benefits such as supplemental unemployment benefits and job 
22 
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security programs negotiated for by the UAW. This exclusion may 
bias the estimated coefficient a3 , but its sign should still be 
negative. As the UAW negotiates wage increases, the demand for 
labor should fall according to basic demand for labor theory. 
Since changes in union power will result in changes in the wage 
elasticity of demand for labor rather than a shift in the demand 
curve, the expected negative coefficient would be shown by a move 
to the left along the demand for labor curve. 
Hypothesis 3 
Unfortunately, measures of the number of technologies used 
by auto producers (such as robots or computer-aided design and 
manufacturing systems) was not available for the time period of 
my study. Therefore, average output per employee hour for SIC 
371 is used as a proxy based on the following reasoning: As the 
implementation of new technologies increases, employee 
productivity or output per employee hour should increase. This 
is, however, an imperfect proxy as output per hour is influenced 
by things other than just changes in technology implementation. 
At any rate, the sign for coefficient a4 can be either positive 
or negative, depending on whether the scale or substitution 
effect dominates. But if a positive (negative) coefficient 
results, it does not mean that there is no substitution (scale) 
effect. It simply means that the scale (substitution) effect is 
stronger. 
Hypothesis 4 
Once again, this variable has fallen victim to data 
23 
•
 
availability problems. No measures of outsourcing arrangements 
were available, as the auto makers and the UAW'maintained this 
was "private information" (from telephone conversation with Lydia 
Fischer, Research Division, UAW). Neither was an acceptable 
proxy found, so this variable was omitted in computer runs of the 
empirical model. However, outsourcing is controlled for to a 
certain extent in that the data for the other variables cover the 
Motor Vehicles and Equipment Industry as a whole, not just the 
auto producers. In other words, changes in outsourcing 
arrangements will in part be accounted for in the employment, 
real wage, and output per hour variables under the "and 
Equipment" part of SIC 371. Increases in outsourcing by the Big 
Three should still result in a leftward shift or an increase in 
the elasticity of the demand for labor curve of the auto 
producers. Strong theoretical support for this argument was 
given in the previous section. 
Finally, the unemployment rate was included to control for 
cyclical movements in employment levels in the auto industry. 
Since automobiles are big ticket items, sales falloff 
dramatically in economic downturns. And because the demand for 
auto workers is derived from the demand for automobiles, 
employment will also naturally falloff during recessionary 
periods. The coefficient as should therefore be negative--as the 
unemployment rate in the economy increases, employment in the 
auto industry should decrease. 
24 
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IV. RESULTS 
The results of the regression equation presented in the 
previous section as obtained through OLS estimation are given in 
Table 2. In short, the results were generally favorable, with 
the exception of the RealWage coefficient, which had the opposite 
of the predicted sign. All coefficients are significant at the 
.01 level, the adjusted RZ is relatively high (=.9344), and the 
Durbin-watson statistic (2.175) suggests that there are no 
problems with auto-correlation. The estimated coefficients and 
their meanings will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Hypothesis 1 was upheld by this empirical model, as is shown 
by the positive coefficient az for the market share variable. 
Although the size of the coefficient suggests that its effect is 
relatively small, it nevertheless has the predicted effect and is 
significant beyond the .01 level. The market share decreases. 
experienced by u.s. auto makers during the 1970s and 1980s, and 
now into the 1990s, have indeed negatively influenced the level 
of employment in the industry. The results demonstrate that a 
decrease in the market share held by u.s. producers of 1% will 
result in a decrease in employment of 4330 jobs (employment 
variable is measured as thousands of employees). It seems then 
that there is merit in the UAW's, the Big Three's, and 
politicians' concerns about the increasing levels of import 
penetration in the u.s. automobile market, not to mention the 
concerns of employees fearing for their jobs. 
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TABLE 2--REGRESSION RESULTS 
INDEPENDENT COEFFICIENT 
VARIABLES 
MktSh 4.33 
(3.51)* 
RealWage 98.17 
(13.59)* 
outputjHr 1.54 
(2.68)* 
Unemp ::"36.38 
(10.86)* 
Constant -568.89 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
* significant at .01 level 
Adjusted R-squared = .9344 
Degrees of Freedom = 23 
Durbin-watson statistic = 2.175 
.'. 
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Skipping Hypothesis 2 for the moment, the estimated 
coefficient a4 for the outputjHr variable turned out to be 
positive and significant at the .01 level. All else constant, 
this coefficient suggests that an increase in technology 
implementation will cause employment to increase. The scale 
effect dominates, although the substitution effect may still be 
present. According to this coefficient, an increase in output 
per hour of one index point (output per hour was measured as an 
index with 1977=100) will lead to an increase in employment of 
1540 workers. 
The unemployment rate vari.able also performed favorably, 
with its coefficient being large, negative, and significant 
beyond the .01 level. As expected, employment in the auto 
industry moves with the business cycle, falling during downturns 
and rising during recoveries. The inclusion of this variable was 
important as it controlled for the cyclical component in the ' 
model and allowed the other variables to predict more accurately. 
Back to Hypothesis 2. The estimated coefficient a3 was 
puzzling at best. It turned out to be a large positive number 
that is highly significant, contradicting basic labor demand 
theory. Essentially, this positive coefficient postUlates an 
upward sloping demand for labor curve, with an increase in the 
real wage causing a large increase in employment. 
While this result is disappointing, there are several 
possible explanations for coefficient a3 having the opposite of 
the predicted sign. The first and most obvious reason could be 
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that the real wage of auto workers may not be such a reasonable 
measure of or proxy for union power after all.' UAW power can 
also be seen by changes in the level of fringe benefits, changes 
in the percent of industry employees unionized, the extent of 
pattern bargaining, and changes in the amount of "domestic 
content" in domestically produced automobiles. The use of a 
union-nonunion wage differential variable may have given a better 
estimation of union power, but such data were not available. 
Looking at the graphs of auto industry employment (Figure 1) and 
real wages (Figure 4), it is no surprise to find a3 to be 
positive since both have a generally downward trend over the past 
ten to fifteen years. Interestingly enough, nominal auto worker 
wages (before adjusting for inflation) had the predicted negative 
sign. 
Second, the real wage variable may be influenced by other 
variables outside the model, causing its coefficient to be 
biased. For example, since the demand for auto workers is 
derived from the demand for automobiles, it should be effected by 
both the price of automobiles and consumers' disposable income. 
Either of these might be correlated with wages, causing the wage 
coefficient to pick up their effects. Similarly, the real wage 
variable may actually be endogenous to the model, although it is 
being represented as an exogenous variable. In other words, real 
wages may actually depend on market share, output per hour, and 
the unemployment rate. In this case, a more sophisticated two­
stage model may be more useful. 
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Finally, union power may actually be a shift parameter, 
rather than just causing a change in the elasticity of or a 
movement along the demand for labor curve. In this case, the UAW 
would operate more like a craft union, influencing both the level 
of employment and the level of wages. An increase in the 
negotiated real wage may be accompanied by an increase in 
negotiated employment, thereby causing an outward shift in the 
demand for labor curve (or what might appear to be an upward­
sloping short-run demand curve). Needless to say, some work 
needs to be done on this union power variable in future research 
efforts. 
Overall, the results of the model were favorable. 
Hypothesis 1 was upheld, the technology effect was decided in 
favor of the scale effect, and the unemployment rate performed 
well as a control for cyclical variations. Furthermore, the 
estimated coefficients were highly significant, and the adjusted 
R2 was high. 
v. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to explain fluctuations in 
employment in the u.s. automobile industry through both 
theoretical and empirical analysis. Four hypotheses of factors 
effecting auto industry employment were developed through a look 
at changes in the industry over the past 30 years. All four of 
these hypotheses were strongly supported theoretically using 
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demand for labor analysis and the Hicks-Marshall Laws of Derived 
Demand. Three of the hypotheses were tested empirically using 
mUltiple regression analysis, two of which were supported and one 
of which was found to contradict basic demand for labor theory. 
In support of the theory were the findings that a positive 
relationship exists between market share and employment in the 
auto industry. This finding implies that the increasing 
competition from Japanese auto producers does indeed cause 
employment of u.s. auto workers to fall. Increases in technology 
implementation were also found to increase employment in the 
industry. This is an encouraging result in that new technologies 
can be used to increase productivity and catch up to the Japanese 
without displacing as many workers as might be expected. The 
real wage variable was the only one that did not perform well, 
with the model predicting a positive relationship between 
employment and real wages. However, this variable was subject to 
some problems (discussed in the previous section) that may have 
influenced its estimated coefficient. Finally, the argument that 
increasing outsourcing by the Big Three should decrease 
employment was theoretically supported, but could not be 
empirically tested due to data constraints. 
Future efforts in this area should concentrate primarily on 
four things: 
1) a more complete and reliable measure of UAW power should 
be found that takes into account fringe benefits as well as 
other aspects of union power (pattern bargaining, domestic 
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content, % unionized, etc.). Furthermore, a two-stage model 
may be appropriate to avoid the endogenous/exogenous problem 
of the real wage variable; 
2) a better measure of technology implementation should be 
used, such as the number of robots in use, which would more 
directly measure the effects of technology changes; 
3) some quantitative measure of outsourcing should be used 
to make the model more complete. A possibility would be the 
percent of domestically produced automobiles that comes from 
foreign sources; and 
4) a less aggregated measure of employment should be found 
that would include only domestic automobile production 
workers rather than employees in the entire industry (SIC 
371) • 
However, I did find a significant relationship between 
employment in the auto industry and international competition 
which is consistent with economic theory. Employment was also 
found to be positively effected by productivity enhancing 
technologies. This seems to indicate that perhaps the best way 
to head-off the adverse effects of international competition on 
employment in the u.S. auto industry is to pursue policies that 
will increase labor productivity. The effects of these two 
variables may offset each other so that employment can be 
somewhat stabilized, even in the face of a decreasing market 
share for u.S. auto producers. 
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